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This report assesses the performance of the 360L009, Ninth Flight,
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motors (RSRM) in respect to case hardware
and joint sealing issues as seen from post-fire assessment of the
case and seals. In addition, all the potential anomalies have been
classified and are summarized in section 5.0.
Figure 1 illustrates the RSRM, consisting of the igniter joint, the
case field joint with the capture feature and the J-joint
insulation configuration, the nozzle-to-case joint with the 100,
7/8-inch radial bolts in conjunction with a wiper 0-ring and
modified insulation design, and the forward-to-aft exit cone joint
(see Figure 2) . Figure 3 shows the configuration of all the
internal nozzle joints. Figure 4 shows a cross section of the S
& A with the Barrier Booster assembly and rotor shaft and SII seal
system.
2.0 SUMMARY
2.1 Post:-Fire Case Assessment Summary
The post fire assessment of both motors showed the case segments
to be in good condition. Field joint fretting on this flight set
ranged from light (<0.003 inch deep) on most of the joints to
locally heavy (>0.005 inch deep) on three of the joints, figure 5
visually summarizes the fretting on all the joints. The LH aft
field joint is the most heavily fretted joint to date, this joint
had previously fretted areas from STS-27. No new fretting was
found in old fretting locations; however new frets were found at
the edges of repaired areas on both the LH center and aft field
joints. All fretting was mapped from the inner clevis leg. The
capture feature fretting was not mapped due the difficulty of
measuring the fretting in the capture feature region, but it is
assumed that the capture feature had similar damage as the inner
clevis leg. Listed below is a summary of fretting for each field
joint:
Field Joint Fretting
LH/FWD Light fretting from 43 to 63, 110 to 129, 172, 187, 207,
243, and 244 degrees.
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LH/CTR Intermittent light fretting around most of the joint with
concentrations of moderate (0.003 to 0.005 inch deep) and
heavy (>0.005 inch deep) fretting between 180 and 300
degrees. A 0.008 inch deep fret was found at 225
degrees.
LH/AFT Intermittent light fretting around most of the joint with
concentrations of moderate (0.003 to 0.005 inch deep) and
heavy (>0.005 inch deep) fretting from 135 through 0 to
9 degrees. Two 0.009 inch deep frets were found at 195,
and 350 degrees and a 0.011 inch deep fret at 278
degrees.
RH/FWD Light frets at 44 and 45 degrees and a 0.004 inch deep
fret at 180 degrees.
RH/CTR Light fretting from 156 to 187, 256 to 280, 298 to 315,
and 338 through 0 to 1 degrees. Moderate (0.003 to 0.005
inch deep) fretting at 118, 305, and 340 degrees. A
0.009 inch deep fret was found at 350 degrees.
RH/AFT Light fretting at 30, 35, 42, and 55 degrees.
Heavy corrosion was found on the RH forward dome igniter inside
diameter and igniter chamber at the location of the blow hole in
the outer' joint putty lay up. The factory joint weather seals were
removed at KSC to prevent rusting of the outer clevis leg under the
pin retainer hat band. Medium corrosion was found under the LH
center aft factory joint weather seal, this weather seal had six
unbonds (Reference 1) . Light corrosion was found on one additional
joint that did not have any unbonds in the weather seal. The
factory joint corrosion is summarized in Table 1. The factory
joint fretting and M-clip fretting is summarized in Table 2.
The stiffener rings and stiffener stubs suffered typical water
impact damage. The RH center stiffener stub suffered an outer
ligament crack. The LH center, LH aft, RH center, and the RH aft
stiffener rings were cracked. Based on the missing instafoam the
cavity collapse load center line was estimated to be 190 degrees
for both motors.
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The Case Component Post Fire Assessment Team has identified six
observations, made during disassembly assessments, as "potential
anomalies". The six potential anomalies were further classified
as two "remains observation" and four as "minor anomalies".
2.2 Postflight Seals Assessment Summary
The post-fire assessment of both motors showed the seals component
to be in good condition. There was no evidence of hot gas or soot
past the J-seal on the six field joints or past the polysulfide on
the two nozzle-to-case joints. The LH igniter joints showed no hot
gas or soot too the primary seals, while the RH igniter had a blow
hole in the inner and outer putty lay ups. The cadmium plating was
corroded on the O.D. edge of the RH inner gasket because the outer
joint blow hole allowed hot combustion gases to come in contact
with the gasket retainer. There was no soot to the aft exit cone
primaries and there was no evidence of soot or hot gas past the
primary seals on any of the internal nozzle joints. Intermittent
aluminum oxidation (A1203) was found between the primary and
secondary seals on both aft exit cones. Overall the grease
application to all field and nozzle-to-case joints was nominal.
The Seals Component Post Fire Assessment Team has identified twelve
observations, made during disassembly assessments, as "potential
anomalies". The twelve potential anomalies were further
classified as three "remains observation", and nine as "minor
anomalies".
3.0 POSTFLIGHT ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVES
Post fire assessment objectives are addressed in Reference 2.
4.0 CASE/SEALS POSTFLIGHT ASSESSMENT RESULTS
Design Engineering performed post fire evaluations of Flight
360L009 forward, center, and aft field joints, aft exit cone field
joints, nozzle-to-case joints, the igniter, and safe and arm joints
at Hangar AF. The safe and arm internal joints, internal nozzles,
and factory joints were disassembled and evaluated at the
refurbishment facilities in Clearfield, Utah. This section
documents the postflight condition of Flight 360L009 case hardware,
sealing surfaces, and seals as noted during disassembly, and
discusses all observations assessed by the respective Component
Program Teams (CPT).
In an attempt to standardize and document the evaluation of flight
motors, a standard evaluation plan has been written (see References
3, 4, 5, and 6) . Appropriate procedures contained in this plan
were used to evaluate the case and seals in the RSRM. The intent
of this plan is to ensure that all pertinent evaluation points of
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Flight 360L009 were examined and documented in a consistent and
complete manner. Also, to accurately document the magnitude of the




Width, essentially zero (have to open up to find the
damage), and depth greater than 0.005 inch.
Scratch: Width less than 0.005 inch and depth less than 0.005
inch.
Nick; Width less than 0.020 inch, but greater than 0.005 inch;
and depth less than 0.010 inch, but greater than 0.005
inch.
Gouge: Width greater than 0.020 inch and depth greater than
0.010 inch.
Circumferential or
Radial Flowline: Visible evidence of incomplete flow or knit of
the material.
(i) Closed: Tightly adhered, not separable, does not open
when lightly probed.






Obvious separation or gap.
Foreign material enclosed in the seal
material.
An air pocket enclosed in the seal material.





Glossy and/or hardened seal surface due to hot
gas impingement.
Seal material missing due to hot gas
impingement or blow by.
Can be wiped off by hand. Surface
discoloration.
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Medium Corrosion: Can not be wiped off by.hand without the use
of a Scotch-Brite material, methyl chloroform,
or grease soaked rag.
Heavy Corrosion; Starting to penetrate into the metal surface
such that pitting and/or metal material is
significantly eroded.
Light Fretting; Pits less than or equal too 0.003 inch deep.
Medium Fretting; Pits less than or equal too 0.005 inch deep but
greater then 0.003 inch deep.
Heavy Fretting: Pits greater than 0.005 inch deep.
The left motor will be discussed first, then the right motor. The
evaluation will start at the igniter and proceed down the motors
to the aft exit cones.
4.1 Left Motor Disassembly Evaluation
4.1.1 External Walk Around
The external walk around assessment revealed no signs of hot gas
leakage past any joints. There was missing instafoam on the center
and forward stiffener rings and the ETA ring at approximately 190
degrees and the K5NA was cracked on the center and aft rings at
this same location.
4.1.2 Safe and Arm Joint
There was soot on the I.D. edge of the retainer but not on either
face of the gasket. There was no signs of blow by past the primary
seal. There was no corrosion or damage found to the joint or the
seals at the time of disassembly.
4.1.2.1 Safe and Arm Device Internal Joints
Assessment of the safe and arm device found raised metal on the
primary seal surface and the lead-in thread of the 198 degree SII
port. Circumferential galling was found on the land between the
primary and secondary seal surfaces of both SII ports. Also,
deformations of the sealing washer of both SII's were found. The
leak test pressure path for the 18 degree SII port was blocked with
grease. Copper particles were found in the grease on the high
pressure side of the rotor shaft secondary O-rings, this
contamination is introduced into the cavity between the primary and
secondary O-rings during the leak test of the rotor shaft seals.
A small nick was present in the rotor housing bore primary seal
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surface, the nick is located approximately 0.120 inch into the
bore.
4.1.3 Outer Igniter Joint (Adapter-to-Forward Dome)
No blow paths through the zinc chromate putty were present and
there was no evidence of hot gas leakage past the primary seal or
damage observed on the joint or gasket seals. A 0.005 inch diameter
by 0.002 inch high raised area was found on the outboard primary
seal cushion of the forward face at 173 degrees. The 115 degree
Igniter Pressure Transducer (IPT) dual seal plug secondary O-ring
(Figure 6) had an I.D. circumferential cut that was caused by
excessive grease in the dove tail groove (Reference 7).
4.1.3.1 Igniter/Case Hardware
No damage was found on the forward dome igniter boss, igniter
adapter, igniter chamber. Two areas of medium corrosion were
present in the igniter through hole at 285 and 324 degrees.
4.1.4 Inner Igniter Joint: (Adapter-to-Chamber)
No blow paths through the zinc chromate putty were present and
there was no evidence of hot gas leakage past the primary seal.
The inner bolts were removed before the igniter was removed from
the forward dome, this allowed the chamber to fall into the forward
segment. When the chamber fell it pivoted about the 270 degree
location and sheared metal of the aft face of the gasket retainer
at this location. No damage observed on the gasket seals. Twenty
two of the Packing with Retainers from the inner joint bolts were
damaged during disassembly. There was soot on the-tips and up to
the primary seal on all special transducer bolts.
4.1.5 Forward Field Joint
There was no sign of hot gas or soot past the J-leg. The grease
coverage was per design and no corrosion was found on any of the
sealing surfaces. The joint was slightly contaminated with debris
and water from hydrolase operations which remove the joint
protection system.
No seal damage was observed at the time of disassembly, and the V-
2 filler was properly installed with no visible damage. Detailed
assessment of the 0-rings revealed no damage.
4.1.5.1 Forward Field Joint: Case Hardware
Assessment of the metal components found light fretting at 43, 57,
62, 110 to 129, 172, 187, 207, 243, and 244 degrees. No medium
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or heavy fretting was found. Figure 7 gives a detailed view of
the fretting.
4.1.6 Center Field Joint
There was no sign of hot gas or soot past the J-leg. The grease
coverage was per design and no corrosion was found on any sealing
surfaces. The joint was slightly contaminated with debris from
hydrolaze operations which remove the joint protection system.
No seal damage was observed at the time of disassembly, and the V-
2 filler was properly installed with no visible damage. Detailed
assessment of the 0-rings revealed no damage.
4.1.6.1 Center Field Joint Case Hardware
Assessment of the metal components found intermittent light
fretting from 10 to 300 degrees. Concentrations of medium and
heavy fretting were found from 180 to 300 degrees. One 0.008 inch
deep fret was located at 225 degrees. Figure 8 gives a detailed
view of the fretting.
4.1.7 Aft Field Joint
There was no sign of hot gas or soot past the J-joint. The grease
coverage was per design and no corrosion was found on any sealing
surfaces. The joint was slightly contaminated with debris and
water from hydrolaze operations which remove the joint protection
system. No seal damage was observed at the time of disassembly and
the V-2 filler was properly installed with no visible damage. No
damage was observed on the three O-rings during detailed
assessment.
4.1.7.1 Aft Field Joint Case Hardware
Assessment of the metal components found light fretting around the
entire circumference except between 9 to 46, and 56 to 116 degrees.
Medium and heavy fretting was present from 135 through zero to nine
degrees. Two heavy frets of 0.009 inch deep fret are located at
195 and 350 degrees. Also, a 0.011 inch deep fret was found at 278
degrees. Figure 9 gives a detailed view of the fretting. This
joint, both clevis and tang had flown on RSRM-2 (STS-27), had been
previously fretted and repaired. Fretting was found at the edges
of repaired areas but not in any areas were metal was removed.
4.1.7.2 ET Attach Stubs
No damage was found on the ET attach forward or aft stubs or bolt
holes.
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No damage was found on the forward stiffener ring.
The center stiffener ring had 12 bolts missing from 172 to 194
degrees when it was still installed on the motor. Post-removal
assessment found the web buckled at 182 degrees, cracked at 196
degrees, and a deformed bolt hole at 180 degrees.
The aft stiffener ring had four missing bolts from 202 to 208
degrees, four missing between 212 and 218 degrees, seven missing
between 182 and 194, and one each at 176 and 178 degrees when it
was still installed on the motor. Post-removal assessment found
the web cracked at 194 degrees, web buckled and missing material
at 181 degrees, and a web buckle at 219 degrees.
4.1.7.4 Stiffener Stubs
The forward stiffener stub, forward stiffener ring stub, and center
stiffener ring stub were not damaged.
The aft stiffener ring stub showed deformed bolt holes from 174 to
180 degrees and from 190 to 202 degrees.
4.1.8 Nozzle-to-Case Joint
There was no evidence of hot gas or soot past the polysulfide. The
grease application was per specification. There was no corrosion
found on either the fixed housing or the aft dome. No polysulfide
extruded past the wiper O-ring. No radial bolt hole disassembly
plugs were damaged during the disassembly process.
Detailed assessment of the O-rings found no damage to any of them.
Detailed assessment of the Packing with Retainers found one with
disassembly damage.
4.1.8.1 Nozzle-to-Case Joint Hardware
The aft dome nozzle boss and the fixed housing showed no signs of
metal damage or corrosion on the mating or sealing surfaces.
4.1.9 Aft Exit Cone Joint (Joint 1)
No pressure paths were found through the RTV, therefore no pressure
or soot reached the primary O-ring. Light corrosion was found on
the aft exit cone flange between 112 and 117 degrees on the O.D.
of the flange. Medium corrosion was found on the I.D. of the
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No damage to the primary or secondary O-rings were observed at the
time of disassembly. Detailed assessment of the O-rings found no
damage on the primary 0-ring. The secondary had two nicked areas
at 111 and 190 degrees. This damage was caused by the disassembly
clips that keep the O-ring from falling out of the groove during
joint separation.
4.1.10 Forward End Ring-To-Nose Inlet: Housing (Joint: 2)
Scalloped shaped sooting was observed around the full circumference
of the joint about half way between the edge of the aluminum
housing and the primary O-ring groove situated between bolt holes.
Typical light sooting was observed up to the primary O-ring at 24
through 36, 72 through 78, 96 through 114, 186 through 192, 204
through 246, 276 through 282, 288 through 318, and 330 through 336
degrees. No soot or evidence of blowby was observed past the
primary O-ring. Typical light corrosion was observed on both
mating surfaces. No damage to the primary or secondary O-rings was
found during detailed assessment and the sealing surfaces suffered
no assembly or disassembly damage. No port plug, O-ring, or port
hole damage was observed. The port hole had nominal grease
coverage.
4.1.11 Nose Inlet Housing-To-Tnroat Support Housing (Joint 3)
No pressure paths through the RTV were observed. No damage was
found on the primary O-ring, the secondary O-ring, or sealing
surfaces during the initial assessment. No corrosion was observed
on the mating surfaces. No damage to the primary or secondary
O-rings was found during detailed assessment. No port plug, 0-
ring, or port hole damage was observed. The port hole had nominal
grease coverage.
4.1.12 Forward Exit: Cone-To-Throat Support: Housing (Joint: 4)
Assessment of the joint revealed no pressure paths through the RTV
backfill. The primary O-ring had a gouged area at 175 degrees,
which measured 0.190 in. long by 0.140 in. wide by 0.010 in. deep.
This gouge was caused during disassembly of the joint. The
secondary O-ring was not damaged, and the sealing surfaces suffered
no assembly/disassembly damage. No corrosion was found on the
joint sealing surfaces. No port plug, O-ring, or port hole damage
was observed.
4.1.13 Fixed Housing-To-Aft End Ring (Joint 5)
Detailed assessment revealed no anomalies to the joint. No damage
was found during assessment of the primary or secondary O-rings,
assessment of the sealing surface revealed no signs of damage.
There was typical intermittent light corrosion of the I.D. lip of
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the aft end ring. No port plug, 0-ring, or port hole damage was
observed. All Packing with Retainers had typical disassembly
damage.
4.1.14 Factory Joints
4.1.14.1 Forward Dome-to-Cylinder Factory Joint
No heavy corrosion was observed. Fretting was observed
intermittently over the entire circumference of the joint. No M-
clip fretting was observed. No 0-ring damage was observed. No
port plug, 0-ring, or port hole damage was observed. The port hole
had grease in it from assembly.
4.1.14.2 Forward Cylinder-to-Cylinder Factory Joint
Heavy corrosion was observed intermittently the entire
circumference of the joint. No joint fretting was observed. M-
clip fretting was observed intermittently the entire O.D. of the
tang. No 0-ring damage was observed. No port plug, 0-ring, or
port hole damage was observed. The port hole had grease in it from
assembly.
4.1.14.3 Center Forward Cylinder-to-Cylinder Factory Joint
No heavy corrosion was observed. Fretting was observed at 1 and
at 210 degrees. No M-clip fretting was observed. No O-ring damage
was observed. No port plug, 0-ring, or port hole damage was
observed. The port hole had grease in it from assembly.
4.1.14.4 Center Aft Cylinder-to-Cylinder Factory Joint
Medium to heavy corrosion was observed downstream of the tang
sealing surface at 191 intermittently through 231, 322, 326 through
337, and 345 through 0 through 45 degrees. Heavy corrosion was
also observed on the tang inside chamfer at 36 intermittently
through 79 degrees and on the outside chamfer at 8 and 14 degrees.
No joint fretting was observed. M-clip fretting was observed
intermittently the entire circumference of the outer tang surface.
No O-ring damage was observed. No port plug, 0-ring, or port hole
damage was observed.
4.1.14.5 ET-to-Stiffener Factory Joint.
Heavy corrosion was observed intermittently on the tang O.D. and
on the inner surface of the outer clevis leg the entire
circumference of the joint. Fretting was observed at 82, 130, 138,
and at 150 degrees. M-clip fretting was observed at 162, 166, 168,
198, 232, 238, 244, 258, 302, 310, 312, 246, and 250 degrees. No
0-ring damage was observed. No port plug, 0-ring, or port hole
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damage was observed. Nominal grease coverage was observed in the
port plug hole.
4.1.14.6 Stiffener-to-Stiffener Factory Joint.
Heavy corrosion was observed intermittently on the tang O.D. and
on the inner surface of the outer clevis leg the entire
circumference of the joint. Fretting was observed at 6, 222, 244,
346, 348, and 358 degrees. M-clip fretting was observed at 174 and
208 degrees. No 0-ring damage was observed. No port plug, 0-ring,
or port hole damage was observed. Nominal grease coverage was
observed in the port plug hole.
4.1.14.7 Aft Dome-to-Stiffener Factory Joint.
Heavy corrosion was observed at 168 through 170 degrees on the tang
sealing surface. Fretting was observed at 14, 190, 194, 224, 230,
234, 238, 250, 254, 282, and 294 degrees. M-clip fretting was
observed intermittently the entire circumference of the tang O.D.
No 0-ring damage was observed. No port plug, 0-ring, or port hole
damage was observed.
4.1.15 Miscellaneous Hardware
Corrosion pits were being found on case segments at GEI spot bond
locations because of galv-anic action between the silver-filled
epoxy (Ecobond 56C) and the D6AC. All GEI was removed at Hanger
AF, light surface corrosion was found on all the spot bond
locations due to removal operations.
4.2 Right Motor Disassembly Evaluation
4.2.1 External Walk Around
The external walk around assessment revealed no signs of hot gas
leakage past any joints. There was missing instafoam on all three
stiffener rings and on the ETA rings at approximately 190 degrees
and the K5NA was cracked on the forward, center, and aft rings at
this same location.
4.2.2 Safe and Arm Joint (Adapter-to-Barrier Booster)
There was soot on the I.D. edge of the retainer but not on either
face of the gasket. There were no signs of blow by past the
primary seal. A rework area was found on the inner side of the
forward face primary seal at 207 degrees. The environmental seal
was torn at 100 and 288 degrees on the forward face of the gasket.
There was no corrosion or damage found to the joint or the seals
at the time of disassembly.
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4.2.2.1 Safe and Arm Device Internal Joints
Assessment' of the safe and arm device found deformations of the
sealing washer of the 18 degree SII. A radial scratch across seal
washer of the 18 degree SII was also found. Raised metal was
present on the primary seal surface and the lead-in thread of the
198 degree SII port. Circumferential galling was found on the land
between the primary and secondary seal surfaces of both SII ports.
A closed radial flow line was found on the I.D. of the B-B leak
test port plug O-ring. Circumferential galling was found on the
seal surface of the Barrier Booster (B-B) and S&A leak check port
plugs. Also, three deformations were present on the underside of
the S&A leak check port plug, the largest deformation extended into
the O-ring footprint.
4.2.3 Outer Igniter Joint (Adapter-to-Forward Dome)
A blow hole through the zinc chromate putty was present at 175
degrees. Soot was found on the I.D. edge of the retainer from 18
to 342 degrees . No anomalies were found on the primary or
secondary seals of the gasket.
4.2.3.1 Igniter/Case Hardware
Heavy corrosion was found on the I.D. edge of the igniter through
hole and igniter chamber at 175 degrees, the corrosion pit in the
through hole measured 0.001 to 0.002 inch deep. No other damage was
found on the igniter adapter, igniter chamber or the igniter
through hole.
4.2.4 Inner Igniter Joint (Adapter-to-Chamber)
A blow hole through the zinc chromate putty was found at 90
degrees, soot was present on the I.D. edge from 88 to 96 degrees.
The outer joint blow hole allowed combustion products to come
in-contact with the O.D. edge of the inner gasket. The combustion
products corroded the cadmium plating off the retainer at the 175
degree location, dimensions are 1.5 inches circumferential by 0.15
inch radial (see Reference 8, Appendix A). Soot was found on the
O.D. edge of the retainer from 60 to 340 degrees. No seal damage
was found on either primary or secondary seals. Eleven Packing
with Retainers from the inner joint bolts were damaged during
disassembly. All the transducer bolts had soot up to the primary
O-ring.
4.2.5 Forward Field Joint
There was no sign of hot gas or soot past the J-leg. The grease
coverage was per design and no corrosion was found on any of the
sealing surfaces. The joint was slightly contaminated with debris
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from the hydrolaze operations which removed the joint protection
system.
No seal damage was observed at the time of disassembly and the V-
2 filler was properly installed with no visible damage. Detailed
assessment of the 0-rings revealed no damage.
4.2.5.1 Forward Field Joint: Case Hardware
Assessment of the metal components found light fretting at 44 and
45 degrees and a 0.004 inch deep fret at 180 degrees. Figure 10
gives a detailed view of the fretting.
4.2.6 Center Field Joint
There was no sign of hot gas or soot past the J-leg. The grease
coverage was per design and no corrosion was found on any of the
sealing surfaces except for as noted below. The joint was slightly
contaminated with debris from the hydrolaze operations which
removed the joint protection system.
No seal damage was observed at the time of disassembly and the V-
2 filler was properly installed with no visible damage. Detailed
assessment of the 0-rings revealed no damage.
4.2.6.1 Center Field Joint Case Hardware
Assessment of the metal components found light fretting from 156
to 187, 256 to 280, 298 to 315, and 338 through 0 to 1 degrees.
Moderate (0.003 to 0.005 inch deep) fretting at 118, 305, and 340
degrees. A 0,009 inch fret was found at 350 degrees. Figure 11
gives a detailed view of the fretting. Also, medium corrosion was
present on the O.D. of the clevis from 86 to 92 degrees.
4.2.7 Aft Field Joint
There was no sign of hot gas or soot past the J-leg. The grease
coverage was per design and no corrosion was found on any of the
sealing surfaces. The joint was slightly contaminated with debris
from the hydrolaze operations which removed the joint protection
system.
No seal damage was observed at the time of disassembly and the V-
2 filler was properly installed with no visible damage. Detailed
assessment of the 0-rings revealed no damage.
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4.2.7.1 Aft Field Joint Case Hardware
Assessment of the metal components found light fretting at 30, 35,
42, and 55 degrees. Figure 12 gives a detailed view of the
fretting.
4.2.7.2 External Attach Stubs
No damage was found on the ET attach forward or aft stubs or bolt
holes.
4.2.7.3 Stiffener Rings
No damage was found on the forward stiffener ring.
The center stiff ener ring had 25 bolts missing from 160 to 208
degrees when it was still installed on the motor. Post-removal
assessment found the web cracked between 178 and 188 degrees at the
web to flange interface. The web was buckled at 159 degrees.
The aft stiff ener ring had nine bolts missing from 162 to 178
degrees and 10 missing from 190 to 208 degrees when it was still
installed on the motor. Post-removal assessment found the web
cracked at 180 and 188 degrees. The web was buckled at 162 and 208
degrees and there were numerous deformed holes between 188 and 204
degrees.
4.2.7.4 Stiffener Stubs
The forward stiffener stub, forward stiffener ring stub, and aft
stiffener ring stub were not damaged.
The center stiffener ring stub had an outer ligament crack at 210
degrees.
4.2.8 Nozzle-to-Case Joint
There was no evidence of hot gas or soot past the polysulfide. The
grease application was per specification. There was no corrosion
found on either the fixed housing or the aft dome. No polysulfide
extruded past the wiper 0-ring. No radial bolt hole disassembly
plugs were damaged during the disassembly process.
Detailed assessment of the 0-rings and Packing with Retainers found
no damage.
4.2.8.1 Nozzle-to-Case Joint Hardware
The aft dome nozzle boss and the fixed housing showed no signs of
metal damage or corrosion on the mating or sealing surfaces.
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4.2.9 Aft Exit Cone Joint (Joint 1)
No pressure paths were found through the RTV, therefore no pressure
or soot reached the primary O-ring. Light corrosion was found on
the I.D. of the flange from 135 to 153 degrees and medium corrosion
from 97 to 130, and 265 to 300 degrees.
No damage was found on the O-ring during detailed assessment.
4.2.10 Forward End Ring-To-Nose Inlet Housing (Joint 2)
Scalloped shaped sooting was observed around the full circumference
of the joint about half way between the edge of the aluminum
housing and the primary O-ring groove situated between bolt holes.
No soot appeared to have reached the primary O-ring. Typical light
corrosion was observed on both mating surfaces. No damage was
observed to the primary O-ring, the secondary O-ring, or sealing
surfaces. No port plug, O-ring, or port hole damage was observed.
The port hole had nominal grease coverage.
4.2.11 Nose Inlet Housing-To-Tnxoat Support Housing (Joint 3)
Detailed assessment revealed no anomalies to the joint. No damage
was found during assessment of the primary or secondary 0-rings,
and the sealing surfaces had no signs of damage. No corrosion was
observed on the mating surfaces. No port plug, O-ring, or port
hole damage was observed. The port hole had nominal grease
coverage.
4.2.12 Forward Exit Cone-To-Throat Support Housing (Joint 4)
No pressure paths were observed through the RTV backfill. No
damage to the primary O-ring, the secondary O-ring, or sealing
surfaces were observed. No corrosion was found on any of the joint
sealing surfaces. Dark colored grease on the area between the
primary and secondary O-ring grooves was observed at 90 through 95,
105 through 115, and 195 through 200 degrees. No port plug, 0-
ring, or port hole damage was observed.
4.2.13 Housing-To-Aft End Ring (Joint 5)
Detailed assessment revealed no anomalies to the joint. No damage
was found during assessment of the primary or secondary 0-rings,
and the sealing surface revealed no signs of damage. There was
intermittent very light corrosion of the I.D. lip of the aft end
ring. No port plug, O-ring, or port hole damage was observed. All
Packing with Retainers had typical disassembly damage.
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4.2.14.1 Forward Dome-to-Cylinder Factory Joint.
Heavy corrosion was observed in the primary 0-ring groove at 222
through 230, and 272 through 292 degrees and the secondary 0-ring
groove at 12 through 18, 238 through 264, 268 through 272, and 294
through 326 degrees. Heavy corrosion was observed on the tang
sealing surface at 224 and 314 degrees. No joint fretting or M-
clip fretting was observed. Water knife damage was observed on the
primary 0-ring but this is an expected condition. No damage to the
secondary 0-ring was observed. No port plug, 0-ring, or port hole
damage was observed.
4.2.14.2 Forward Cylinder-to-Cylinder Factory Joint.
No heavy corrosion was observed. Joint fretting was observed at
174, 241, 243, 273.5 through 285, 336 and 340 degrees. M-clip
fretting was observed at 236 and at 238 degrees on the outer tang
surface. No 0-ring damage was observed. No port plug, 0-ring, or
port hole damage was observed. The port hole had nominal grease
coverage.
4.2.14.3 Center Forward Cylinder-to-Cylinder Factory Joint.
No heavy corrosion was observed. No joint fretting or M-clip
fretting was observed. No 0-ring damage was observed. No port
plug, O-ring, or port hole damage was observed.
4.2.14.4 Center Aft Cylinder-to-Cylinder Factory Joint.
No heavy corrosion was observed. No joint fretting or M-clip
fretting was observed. No O-ring damage was observed. No port
plug, 0-ring, or port hole damage was observed. The port hole did
not have grease in it.
4.2.14.5 ET-to-Stiffener Factory Joint.
No corrosion was observed in the joint. Fretting was observed at
12, 18, 22, 26, 34, 46, 50, 52, 54, 116, 178, 186, 192, 198, 202,
226, 234, 242, 246, 258, 316, 336, 338, and 344 degrees. M-clip
fretting was observed at 2, 26, 38, 294, 296, and 358 degrees. No
0-ring damage was observed. No port plug, 0-ring, or port hole
damage was observed. Nominal grease coverage was observed in the
port hole.
4.2.14.6 Stiffener-to-Stiffener Factory Joint.
No corrosion was observed in the joint. Fretting was observed
intermittently from 162 through 0 through 30 degrees. M-clip
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fretting was observed intermittently the entire circumference of
the outer tang surface. No O-ring damage was observed. No port
plug, O-ring, or port hole damage was observed. Nominal grease
coverage was observed in the port hole.
4.2.14.7 Aft Dome-to-Stiffener Factory Joint.
No corrosion was observed in the joint. No fretting was observed
in the joint. M-clip fretting was observed intermittently the
entire circumference of the outer tang surface. No O-ring damage
was observed. No port plug, O-ring, or port hole damage was
observed. Nominal grease coverage was observed in the port hole.
4.2.15 Miscellaneous Hardware
Corrosion pits were being found on case segments at GEI spot bond
locations because of galvanic action between the silver-filled
epoxy (Ecobond 56C) and the D6AC. All GEI was removed at Hanger
AF, light surface corrosion was found on all the spot bond
locations due to removal operations.
4.3 Leak Check and Vent Port Plug Post Flight Evaluations
The evaluation of the port plugs, after flight use, consisted of
adding to the port plug torque database, visual inspection of the
port plug for damage, and visual inspection of the port plug
0-rings for anomalies.
The port plugs had breakaway torques recorded. This exercise was
done to add to the port plug torque database so evaluation of
installation torque levels and locking devices can be made on each
port plug.
A summary of the postflight evaluations of the port plugs and port
plug 0-rings is contained in Table 3. Port plugs in the igniters,
field joints, and nozzle-to-case joints were removed and assessed
during the disassembly operations at KSC. Port plugs in the
internal nozzle joints and factory joints were removed and assessed
at Clearfield. Closure screws were removed from the vent port
plugs at KSC and assessed there.
During the assessment at KSC several observations were reported
which were O.D. extrusion damage to the adjustable vent port plug
primary O-ring and I.D. circumferential cut to the field joint leak
check port plug O-ring. The extrusion damage occurred during the
installation of the vent port plug in to the port. This damage is
an acceptable condition because of the design of the primary seal.
The primary O-ring is used as a packing seal. When the adjustable
vent port plug is fully installed in the vent port, the primary 0-
ring extrudes out of the gland area and is damaged. The damage is
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inherent to the design. The I.D. circumferential cut occurs when
the leak check port plug is removed from the port. The last thread
turns into the 0-ring and cuts it. This is an acceptable
condition. The only other condition observed was the separation
on the I.D. mold line of the IPT secondary 0-ring which is
addressed in section 5.2.
5.0 Post-Fire Team Assessments
The Seals Component Post-Fire Assessment Team, the Case Component
Post-Fire Assessment Team, and the RPRB has reviewed all
observations presented in this document and has determined that
eighteen observations were potential anomalies, classified as
critical, major, minor or remains observation, as defined under
Table 5 criteria. The Post Fire Anomaly Record (PFAR) number is
referenced after each potential anomaly.
5.1 Remains Observation
There were four potential anomalies that were classified as
"remains observation", they are:
1. Sheared metal on inner gasket retainer (360L009A-05)
2. Deformations on underside of S & A leak check port plug
(360L0.09A-20)
3. Outer ligament crack on center stiffener stub (360L009B-
02)
4. Pitting on forward dome boss (360L009B-04)
5.2 Minor Anomalies
Fourteen potential anomalies were classified as "minor anomalies",
they are:
1. Missing cadmium plating on igniter gasket retainer
(360L009B-07)
2. I.D. circumferential cut on the secondary 0-ring of the
IPT plug (360L009A-09)
3. Field joint fretting (360L009A-08, 360L009B-06)
4. Factory joint fretting (360L009 , 360L009
5. Deformations in the sealing washer of the SII's
(360L009A-11, 360L009B-12)
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6. Copper particles in Barrier Booster rotor shaft grease
(360L009A-13)
7. Radial scratch across the sealing washer of the SII
(360L009B-14)
8. Galling on shoulder seal surface of MS9902-01 leak test
port plug (360L009B-15)
9. SII leak test port through-hole filled with grease
(360L009A-16)
10. Raised metal on shoulder seal surface of SII port
(360L009B-18)
11. Nick on primary sealing surface of Barrier Booster bore
(360L009A-20)
5.3 Major Anomalies
There were no major anomalies
5.4 Critical Anomalies
There were no critical anomalies
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Packing No Damage No Damage
with
Retainer
Special Bolt Primary No Damage No Damage
(270 Deg.) 0-ring
Packing No Damage No Damage
with
Retainer
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Note: These criteria to be applied to the specific observed "potential
anomaly" as it relates to the observed article and as it relates to
subsequent articles.
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EXIT CONE JOINT (VIEW D)
Figure 2. RSRM Joint Configuration
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Forward Exit Cone Assembly
1 ) Forward-to-Aft Exit Cone Reid Joint
(not shown below)
Aft Exit Cone Assembly
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© Flexible Bearlng-to-Rxed Housing Joint
Figure 3. RSRM Nozzle Internal Joints
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Figure 5 Field Joint Fretting Sunmary
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Igniter Adapter (top view)
Figure 6 Igniter TPT Plug
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Figure 8 LH Center Field Joint Fretting
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Figure 9 LH Aft Field Joint Fretting
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Figure 10 RH Forward Field Joint Fretting
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Figure 11 RH Center Field Joint Fretting
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ALL FRETTNG WAS LIGHT
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Figure 12 RH Aft Field Joint Fretting
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Overall Field Joint Fretting Clarification Form
Motor No.: Pate; 3- %-
Assessment Engineer(s): V U • c?/vn,/i57e. D. Mf 0.







Pits over 0.005" deep.
270
270
Clarification Number: Corresponding Comment Number(s):
SPACE OPERATIONS
Field Joint Mapping of Fretting Clarification Form
Motor No.: Side; Eg, Left (A) Q Right- (B) Date;
Assessment Englneer(s);
Field Joint: DForward ( Sta. = 851.5) QCenter (Sta. - 1171.5) ) Aft (Sta. = 1491.5)
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